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BOOK R E V I E W
Wall Street: Security Risk. HURDBARUCH.
Washington: Acropolis
Books Ltd. 1971. Pp. iv. 356. SS.95.

Fashions in books follow fashions in life. And a fashion with the
perennial endurance of the quest for wealth brings each year a fertile
harvest to swell the bookseller's inventory.
Books about the stock market. appearing and receding in dull
succession. rank high among popular non-fiction works in terms of
the number of titles published. These books, which usually combine
basic information with more or less "helpful'" hints and investment
techniques. seem to sell when taken as a group. But seldom does a
factual book about America's second-most sought after value achieve
or deserve distinction.
The Ilfoney Ganre by "Adam Smith" (later revealed to be
George J. W. Goodman) combined the dual virtues of expos6 and
alluring subject matter to propel itself to best-seller success. The inL~Z:
sightful and somewhat discomfiting revelations of IVall S I ~ L -Stwrity Risk perhaps aim to provide similarly potent promotional stuff.
The two books are. however. quite different in their approach. The
author of The hiorley Gartre \\?as, despite his candor and consequent
attempt at anonymity. a securities industry insider. His presentation
of the foibles and human frailties of the brokerage community
permeated with a boys-\\rill-be-boys attitude of sympathetic understanding. Not so with Hurd Baruch. whose authorship of lt"t711Srru.t.f:
Security Risk evidences the predictable ritualized quasi-hostility of a
professional regulator. His years on the staff of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (where he has risen to the level of Special
Counsel in the Division of Trading and Markets) have obviously left
Mr. Baruch with not only an intimate knowledge of the securities
industry but with a somewhat special perspective as v;ell.
It is this perspective that brings life to what amounts to a 3Q8plus page essay on the capitalization practices of brokerage firms and
the dry complex of laws. rules and regulations pertaining thereto.
With a sort of subtle drama. and an eye to the comprehension problems of the non-lawyer reader. Mr. Baruch builds an unsettling and
at times astonishing picture of the inefficient and anti-competitive
house that American capitalism built.
That house is of course the New York Stock Exchange. the
Exchange itself and the relatively limited number of influential firms
which together control its policy and furnish its personality. Unfor-
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tunate though it may be that the dominant factor i n the securities
business is a monopolistic cartel. the situation becomes preposterous
when. as a matter of federal policy. the cartel is expected to regulate
itself in the public interest. Such. at least. is the conclusion of Mr.
Baruch.
An impressive. sometimes ponderous. array of evidence is produced in support of the conclusion that self-regulation has amounted
to no-regulation, except to the extent that regulation serves the purposes of the securities industry giants. Such a conclusion is not especially surprising; what is more surprising is that anyone ever really
believed that self-regulation could work in the first place. To perceive
why self-regulation was made a key component of federal securities
policy and to appreciate the specific short-comings of self-regulation.
an understanding must first be had of the conditions in the securities
business which give rise to a need for any special regulation at all.
Brokerage houses are custodians of huge amounts of their customers' property. Cash customers leave freely withdrawable money and
securities with their brokers. for greater or lesser periods of time.
largely for convenience. Customers who receive credit from brokerage
houses also leave money and securities on deposit. though credit customers are not free to withdraw until repayment of credits extended.
The brokerage firms neither pay nor. in the case of cash customers.
render any special services for the use of this property. Nor are the
firms subject to extensive regulation (as are, for example. insurance
companies and banks) tending to assure safe use of their customers'
property.
To be sure. however. customers' cash and securities are used by
their brokers. In fact. such property constitutes a major component
in the financial structure of New York Stock Exchange member
firms. Experience has shown that withdrawals by customers are ordinarily offset by other customers' deposits. There is thus no reason for
securities firms to keep sufficient cash and securities on hand to meet
all obligations to all of their customers. Indeed, it would be wasteful
for a firm to do so when the bulk of such funds could be at work in
the firm's business-making money for its owners.
Customers' securities. left with the firm, provide an even more
important source of financing than does customers' cash. Most commonly. brokers turn customers' securities into cash by pledging them
as collateral for bank loans. This method, despite its simplicity and
utility. has the disadvantage of being relatively inefficient: banks do
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not like to lend more than 75 per cent of the market value of the
securities pledged. By lending customers' securities to another broker
(on which a 100 per cent deposit is required). or by delivering them
in settlement of sales by customers (or sales by the firm itself). the
entire market value of the customers' securities can be converted to
cash.
The securities industry justifies this cashing in on the ground that
it is necessary in order to finance custonlers' margin (i.t9. credit)
transactions. This justification is only partial at best. S o t only is cash
realized far in excess of margin financing needs. but as an everyday
occurrence customers' fully paid for securities son~ehov;seem to get
accidently (and unlawfully) pledged. I f and when disaster strikes.
these fully paid customer-owned securities can be redeemed by their
owners-but only by paying for them again.
All of which might be highly academic if the securities industry
(or even the giants of the securities industry) were built upon the solid
rocks of hard capital which the public is led to believe underlie lipall
Street.' Unfortunately. however. disasters do strike. as in 1969 and
1970 when over one hundred New York Stock Exchange member
firms became basket cases ripe for the receivers. Losses to customers
of these firms have so far been measured only in terms of inconvenience. frozen accounts and unrequested transfers of accounts from
broker to broker. But this comparatively happy fact derives more
from the enlightened benevolence of the New York Stock Exchange
than from any built-in protection to which customers \yere entitled as
such. For when a brokerage firm fails. all who have supplied it with
financing. including its customers, stand to lose.? Moreover. when
hard times are coming. the suppliers of a firm's equity financing. v;ho
are normally the first to know. seem to find \~:aysto get their money
out while the getting is still possible.
To protect the customers stranded by this \vave CIS insolvent
firms. the New York Stock Exchange came to the rescue pitching in
hlr. Baruch's implications notwithstanding, no question of basic propriety is r a i r d bq
the broker's use of customer-owned property. The securities industry must compete oith alternative economic investments for capital resources by impljing a cornpatitire n t e of rcturn. Tt;.
availability for use in the firm's business of property in customers' accounts i s a factor nficsting
that rate of return. Specific charges for services are another factor. Assum~ngthat it is c q to
capital than
enter the securities business (Mr. Baruch notes that a brokcnge firm requires 161)
a franchise hamburger stand). one must conclude that it ~vorltsout in the long run so that ths
securities business is not immorally profitable at the customer's expense once risk and ~ t t : r
relevant factors have been taken into considention. The customer bcnefits thraugh lor$tr
charges for specific services.
Of course in highly prosperous times only the ewers stand directly to gain.
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not only the entirety of its "Special Trust ~ u n d "but throwing in its
savings for a new building as well. Even this magnanimous gesture
was inadequate. however. and talk of "technicalities" gained currency as the Exchange looked for ways to avoid responsibilities to the
customers of destitutes among its least powerful member^.^ Mr. Baruch implies that only congressional intervention caused a change of
heart on the part of the Exchange which ultimately came to the aid
of the customers in question-as a price for passage of the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970.
Interestingly. the securities industry initially opposed the enactment of legislation to provide for insurance of brokerage accounts
similar to that offered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
for bank depositers. Perhaps it was fear of accompanying reforms
which prompted opposition to such patently beneficial legislation. I n
any event, industry pressures left their mark on the final Securities
Investor Protection Act: insurance of customers' accounts is limited
to at most $50.000 whereas obligations of bankrupt firms to otlter
brokers may be covered 100 per cent. Intense industry interest in
dominating the Securities Investor Protection Corporation resulted in
an ambiguous compromise which offers no assurance of public control over the disbursement of taxpayers' money.
Despite the securities industry's opposition to any substitution of
outside regulation in place of self-regulation. the inherent weakness
of self-regulation became incontrovertably apparent during the 196970 debacle of failures. The pressures on brokers' "back-office" clerical personnel created by the upsurge in trading volume in the late
sixties resulted in the much talked about "breakdown" which played
a large part in a number of brokerage house failures. The value of
securities undelivered by their settlement dates grew to billions of
dollars. One prestigious house had lost track of $700 million of securities and still attempted to do business as usual. That this firm was
able to do so is cited by Mr. Baruch as evidence of how the securities
industry "abdicated its self-regulatory responsibilities."
In these difficult circumstances, self-regulation proved to be a
system of imposing only token or ineffective sanctions and controls
on violators; the Exchange seemed to be powerless to do much more
against influential industry members. Indeed, during the speculative
rush of the late 1960's. when accounts and new offices were opened
a

Strictly speaking, ex-members.
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with abandon in the face of mounting paperwork difficulties. the
Exchange took no effective action. despite prompting and prodding
by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Perhaps the special pressures generated out of trjing times may
explain (but never justify) the failure of self-regulation to adhere
strictly to existing standards. But what can be said \$hen the selfregulator's prescriptions of rules. adopted for all time and uninfluenced by the standard-bending passions of the worst of financial bad
times. are in reality mere illusions of regulation?
As a striking example of such non-regulatory rules. Mr. Baruch
cites the so-called "net capital rule" which has been used by the Sell,
York Stock Exchange in order to exempt its members from the more
stringent and far less loop-hole ridden net capital rule of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Both the Commission\ net capital rule
and that of the Exchange are supposed to protect investors by requiring. as a condition of doing business. that the brokerage firm ov;ners'
investment, excluding illiquid assets. bear a fixed ratio (26:Ij to the
firm's aggregate indebtedness. Nonetheless. differences in the details
of the two rules permit a considerable "protection gap." For example. under the Exchange's net capital rule. owners of firms can pull
money out while the firm already has too little capital to comply with
the net capital rule. The observance of the Exchange's rule has
matched the laxity of the rule itself. At least one firm was counting
among its liquid assets the anticipated tax refunds to be paid at yearend in respect of losses sustained to date.
The sum of the New York Stock Exchange's regulatory record
during the collapses of 1969-70 was not very good. Mr. Baruch would
have us conclude. The Exchange either did not have the pov.er (or
competance) or the will to set effective standards. discover violations
of those standards and punish the violators.
One might inquire as to the whereabouts of the Exchange Cornmission a t such a crucial time. If the troubles were so virulent, violations so rampant and dangerous, and the public interest so jeopart behind the
dized, why was the SEC content to stay for the m ~ s part
scenes ineffectivually pushing on strings? Mr. Baruch admits that the
Commission was aware of the problems and mindful of some possible
solutions. Moreover, the Commission was not legally po\l:erless, at
least where firms having severe business difficulties might, at very
least, be guilty of fraud in the sale of securities.
k
Mr. Baruch's explanations for SEC inaction tend to be ~ e a and
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suggest that /lobody knew precisely how to make the best out of a very
bad time for the securities business. Other than attempting to "run
with" firms having difficulties (as the New York Stock Exchange
apparently did). about the only alternative would have been to close
them down. Whether this solution to the difficulties of 1969-1970
would have been preferable-or better for the customers of the firms
concerned-is highly questionable. Can the New York Stock Exchange's way of doing things be so bad when. after all is said and
done. the Exchange picks up the tab where it has not quite succeeded?
Focusing on its results rather than on its procedures. the New
York Stock Exchange has done a pretty fair job of protecting investors from monetary loss. especially considering that it is a "private
club controlled by a small clique of firms." Parallels to the Exchange's record of willingness to sacrifice cash are hard to find in the
business world. This is not. however. to say that a few adjustments
adjustmentsmight not be helpful. Mr. Baruch feels that specific action
is needed in the related areas of customer protection. "back office"
operational systems. price competition in brokerage services. and increased govern mental oversight.
Customer protection reforms would include a requirement of
more effective segregation from the broker's own property of customers' property entrusted to the broker. Deep inside. Mr. Baruch
seems disposed to accomplish this segregation by legally requiring
separation of the "broker" (agent's) function of securities firms from
their "dealer" (principal's) functions. Sensing that such a radical
proposal will not be immediately embraced. alternative (and somewhat less drastic) surgery is also proposed. analogizing to commodities market practices and suggesting stiff requirements for escrowed
reserves. A realistic net capital rule and improved record-keeping and
monitoring procedures are also components in Mr. Baruch's customer protection plan.
While implementing the segregation proposals will deprive securities firms of a significant source of financing. Mr. Baruch seems
convinced that the industry as a whole will not be put underwater as
a consequence. Difficulties may result for shaky firms. but these are
precisely the firms which. under present regulations. cause the greatest
customer protection problems. Other firms may replace the lost financing by publicly offering their own equity securities. thereby allowing investors to share in not only the risks but also the profits of
capitalizing the securities industry.
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As the panacea for "back-office" operational problems. Mr.
Baruch advocates a certificateless society in which the stock certificate would be replaced by computer memories and non-negotiable
"confirmations of ownership." This. together with price competition
on brokerage commissions. would lead to an industry-\vide shakedown through which (according to Mr. Baruch] only a small number
of powerful oligopolists would survive. And such a result. supposedly.
would be optimal from the investor's point of vie\v.
On the question of increased governmental oversight. Mr. Bnruch notes (a) the inevitable inability of self-regulation to assure investor protection and (b) the fine record of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. together with the fact the Commission needs more
money and independence. Unwilling to call for the outright abandonment of self-regulation. he calls instead for "coordinate regulation"
with the government supreme. leaving only a supplementary role to
the self-regulators. Making the Commission the czar of the industry
would no doubt result in more efficient regulation than the present
anarchy of give and take. Whether it would result in "better" regulation is another question.

John .+
Hlinlbach*
I.

* Assistant Professor of Law. Brooklyn Law School; B.A.. Miami Llnivcrsity. 1963; J.D.
summa cum laude, Ohio State University. 1966.

Heinonline

38 Brook. L. Rev. 1309 19711972

